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the only minority venireman, where it facially appeared that 
the venireman was well qualified to serve and the basis for the 
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2. Was the evidence insufficient to convict Mr, Cantu 
of the three offenses? 
3. Did the trial court err in allowing the charge of 
aggravated robbery to be submitted to the jury where there was 
no evidence that any taking or attempted taking was 
accomplished by force or fear or that any taking was from the 
person or immediate presence of the victim? 
4. Did the trial court err in giving a parties 
instruction where the evidence was that either Mr. Cantu was 
himself the victim's attacker or that he was not present in her 
home at that time? 
5. Did the court err in not modifying or arresting 
judgment when before sentencing it was determine that Mr. Cantu 
is mentally ill? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
vs. : 
JUAN de DIOS CANTU, : Case No. 860052 
Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Juan de Dios Cantu, appeals from a 
judgment and conviction imposed for Aggravated Robbery, a First 
Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 
as amended); Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1953 as amended) and 
Aggravated Assault, a Third Degree Felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann §76-5-103 (1953 as amended) in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge presiding. 
Statement of Facts 
In the early morning hours of December 22, 1984, sixty 
eight year old Adelia Pippy was awakened when her pillow was 
removed from beneath her head. A man then pulled her out of 
bed and demanded money (T. 228). Mrs. Pippy said she saw an 
unidentifiable form of another man standing in her darkened 
bedroom (T. 231). Mrs. Pippy described the voice of her 
assailant as cold and deliberate but did not notice any kind of 
accent (T. 282). Mrs. Pippy was then struck with a club on the 
head, pushed onto the bed and stabbed (T. 233). 
Items were taken from throughout the house but Mrs. 
Pippy testified that she heard nothing being taken after the 
men left her bedroom (T. 278). No items were taken from her 
bedroom (T. 247, 363). After an hour or so Mrs. Pippy made her 
way to a neighbor's house (T. 243), the police were called and 
Mrs. Pippy was taken to the hospital. 
When police came to investigate the crime, they found 
a jacket near the kitchen that later was determined to belong 
to the Appellant. The jacket and items in the kitchen had 
blood stains which a witness testified were consistent with 
Mrs. Pippy's blood type (T. 416). No fingerprints of the 
Appellant were found anywhere in the house except on items 
found inside one of the coat pockets. None of these items 
belonged to Mrs. Pippy (T. 444). A fingerprint found in the 
home was not matched with any suspect (T. 436). 
Salt Lake City Police Officer Mike Hanks, who arrived 
quickly on the crime scene, followed footprints from Mrs. 
Pippy's house to a house in which a Miquel Marcus was staying 
(T. 463). From conflicting statements given him, Officer Hanks 
formed an opinion that Miguel Marcus had something to do with 
the crime (T. 467). No attempt was made to check his juvenile 
record (T. 535) or secure a photograph of Marcus to show to 
Mrs. Pippy (T. 547). 
Mrs. Pippy later described her assailant as dark 
complected with normal length hair and no beard (T. 285, 292, 
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296) and having no accent (T. 282). Oclries Chacon testified 
that Appellant at the time of the crime had long hair and a 
beard (T. 474). The trial court noted that Mr. Cantu spoke 
with a discernible Hispanic accent (T. 758). 
During the investigation, Mrs. Pippy was shown an 
array of photographs and according to Detective John Lomax, 
Mrs. Pippy indicated that she thought Appellant, whose picture 
was in the group, was her assailant (T. 527). The officer 
testified that he commented to Mrs. Pippy that she had 
identified the suspect and that she had expressed relief for 
having picked the right man (T. 527). 
At a 1:00 p.m. lineup on August 13, 1985, Mrs. Pippy 
failed to identify Mr. Cantu, assuring the prosecutor and 
defense counsel that she did not believe the face of her 
assailant was among those eight men (Addendum A, p. 26). At a 
2:00 p.m. Preliminary Hearing the same day, Mrs. Pippy pointed 
at Appellant, who sat isolated at counsel table, unhesitatingly 
identified him as her attacker and stated that she would never 
forget his face (T. 337). She attempted to justify her 
non-selection minutes earlier by saying that she had been told 
at the lineup that she needed to be absolutely sure before 
making an identification but the record of the lineup disputes 
this. (T. 333 See Addendum A and Exhibit 26, lineup card). 
During voir dire at trial Appellant made a motion to 
quash the jury panel or in the alternative to supplement the 
venire with minorities because no minority venireperson had 
been summoned (T. 72). The trial court instructed the jury 
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clerk to call two minority venirepersons to supplement the 
venire in this trial (T. 160). One of these minorities was Mr. 
James Lopez. Mr. Lopez, who appeared to be in his thirties, is 
L.D.S., married, has a steady job, studied at L.D.S. Business 
College, and has two children (T. 179). He lived within blocks 
of another juror who sat on the case. The other specially 
called venireperson was not in fact a minority member and was 
subsequently excused for cause (T. 192). Mr. Lopez was 
peremptorally challenged by the prosecution and Appellant's 
counsel objected to this peremptory challenge as having been 
used in a discriminatory fashion (T. 201). Appellant's counsel 
also made a motion to have the prosecutor testify to have him 
state under oath whether the Hispanic origin of Mr. Lopez was 
the reason the prosecutor struck Mr. Lopez (T. 201). The 
prosecutor, David Walsh, objected to the motion and the court 
ruled that the law did not allow him to make such inquiry and 
the prosecutor could use his peremptory challenges as he chose 
(T. 203). A motion for mistrial on the basis of using "an 
illegal, inappropriate, racial racist (sic) method to select 
the jury" was denied by the court (T. 203). 
During the course of the trial Appellant's counsel 
showed Mrs. Pippy a photo and asked if she recognized the man. 
Mrs. Pippy handed counsel a photo and said, "This is the man" 
(T. 300). The photo was not of the Appellant and when pressed 
further a perturbed, frustrated Mrs. Pippy replied that the 
photo was of a man she had seen on the street (T. 301). 
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During the trial Mr. Cantu testified that he had 
indeed entered Mrs. Pippy's house earlier with two others, 
Irene Garcia and Jeremy Garcia, looking for a warmer coat (T. 
583). He believed that the house was empty as he had not seen 
a car at the house or lights on in the dwelling (T. 584). Mr. 
Cantu testified that he heard snoring and encouraged the others 
to leave, and that all left (T. 588). Appellant also testified 
that later in the evening two other people he knew decided to 
return to Mrs. Pippy's house to steal items left behind (T. 
597). Mr. Cantu swore that he never returned to Mrs. Pippy's 
house after his earlier entry, when he stole a warmer coat (T. 
597). 
At the end of the evidence the trial court allowed a 
parties instruction (Jury Instruction No. 28) over the 
objection of Appellant's counsel (T. 649). 
After Mr. Cantu was convicted but prior to sentencing, 
Appellant's counsel made a motion to arrest judgment under Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-23 (1982 Supp.) because Dr. Breck LeBegue had 
examined Mr. Cantu and had found him to be mentally ill (R. 
132). The court had appointed Dr. LeBegue as alienist at 
defense counsel's request because of her increasing concerns 
that Mr. Cantu was not well (R. 137, See Addendum B). When the 
court refused to arrest judgment, Appellant's counsel asked the 
court to modify the verdicts from guilty to guilty and mentally 
ill (T. 720). The court also denied this motion and sentenced 
Appellant to five years to life for each of the two first 
degree felonies and zero to five for the third degree felony. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The first argument presented on appeal involves the 
trial court's error in not requiring the prosecutor to explain 
his peremptory challenge of the lone minority venireperson and 
denying the motion for mistrial. The prosecutor's use of the 
peremptory challenge in a discriminatory manner violated 
Appellant's right to a trial by a jury drawn from a fair cross 
section of the community. 
The second argument is that insufficient evidence was 
presented on the three charged offenses introduced at trial to 
find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The third issue on appeal is that the trial court 
committed error in allowing the charge of aggravated robbery to 
go to the jury where no property was taken from the person or 
immediate presence of the victim. 
The fourth point is that the court committed error in 
giving the parties instruction (Jury Instruction No. 28) when 
the state's case rested on the victim's eyewitness 
identification of Mr. Cantu as the man who assaulted her. No 
evidence was introduced that put the Appellant in the victim's 
house at the time of the assault other than the eyewitness 
identification which would make Appellant a principal. 
Finally, Mr. Cantu contends that the trial court erred 
in not modifying or arresting judgment when Dr. LeBegue 
testified that the Appellant was mentally ill prior the 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR MISTRIAL AFTER THE PROSECUTOR USED A PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE TO STRIKE A HISPANIC VENIRE PERSON AND NOT 
REQUIRING THE PROSECUTOR TO EXPLAIN HIS ACTION. 
During voir dire the prosecutor peremptorally 
challenged Mr. John Lopez, a venire-person who objectively was 
satisfactory but, like Appellant, he is a Hispanic. 
Appellant's counsel asked the trial court to order the 
prosecutor to testify to state whether the reason he struck Mr. 
Lopez was his Hispanic origin (T. 201). The prosecutor 
objected and the trial court refused to make the inquiry (T. 
201). Appellant moved for a mistrial on the basis that the 
prosecutor had used "an illegal method, an inappropriate, 
racial, racist method to select the jury" (T. 203). The motion 
was denied. Mr. Lopez, specially added to the venire over the 
state's objection, as a minority representative, was the sole 
racial minority on the venire. 
Recently the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 
84-6263, 39 Cr. L. 3061 (April 30, 1986) held that a state 
denies a black defendant equal protection when it puts him on 
trial before a jury from which members of his race have been 
purposefully excluded. The Court also held that a defendant 
may now establish a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's 
exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. 
This decision reaffirmed the principle of Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 503 (1880) where the U.S. Supreme Court 
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held thab a state denied a black defendant equal protection 
when Blacks had been excluded from the venire. The court said, 
however, that a defendant has "no right to a petit jury 
composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race." 
Strauder at 305. Strauder showed that the Supreme Court was 
concerned with racial discrimination in the selection of jury 
venires as have other cases of discrimination in selection of 
the jury panel. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), was a case in 
which the prosecutor used six peremptory challenges to strike 
the six black persons in the venire. The Supreme Court held 
the state may not exercise its peremptory challenges to exclude 
Blacks from the jury "for reasons wholly unrelated to the 
outcome of the particular case on trial" or to deny to Blacks 
"The same right and opportunity to participate in the 
administration of justice enjoyed by the White population." 
Swain at 224. The Swain Court required, however, that the 
defendant show the peremeptory challenge system as a whole was 
being perverted and required a showing of systematic abuse by a 
prosecutor in more than one case. In this case evidence was 
presented on Mr. Cantu's behalf that during the three month 
period, January - March 1983, in every instance in which a 
venireperson with an Hispanic surname was removed by a 
peremptory challenge in Third District Court criminal cases, it 
was the prosecution that removed him or her (T. 312). Batson, 
however, specifically overturned that evidentiary burden and 
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ruled that a defendant may show purposeful racial 
discrimination based solely on evidence concerning a 
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the 
defendant's trial. 
Batson sets out a two-step process by which a 
defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful 
discrimination by the prosecutor in the use of his peremptory 
challenges. First, the defendant must show that he is a member 
of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has 
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire 
members of the defendant's race. The defendant may also rely 
on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury 
selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are 
of a mind to discriminate. 39 Cr. L. 3066. Second, the 
defendant must show that such facts and any other relevant 
circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used 
peremptory challenges to exclude veniremen from the petit jury 
on account of their race. Once a defendant has made a prima 
facie showing of racial discrimination the burden shifts to the 
state to offer a neutral explanation for challenging the 
jurors. The Court stated that a prosecutor may not rebut a 
prima facie showing by saying that he challenged the jurors on 
the assumption that they would be partial to the defendant 
because of the their shared race. 
In this case the Appellant, Juan Cantu, is a Hispanic 
and thus is a member of a cognizable racial group, per the 
United States Census Bureau (See Addendum C) and United States 
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v, Testy 550 F. 2d 577 (10th Circuit 1976). The prosecutor in 
this case used a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Lopez, a 
venireperson who while Hispanic was in every way qualified to 
serve on the petit jury (T. 194). Mr. Lopez lives within 
blocks of another juror who the prosecutor let sit on the jury 
(T. 190). Lopez is LDS, studied accounting at LDS Business 
College, is married and has a steady job (T. 179). These facts 
ought to raise an inference that the prosecutor in this case 
used his peremptory challenge to remove Mr. Lopez solely on 
account of his race. Appellant objected to the prosecutor's 
removal of Mr. Lopez (T. 201) and asked the judge to require 
the prosecutor to state under oath his reason for striking Mr. 
Lopez. The prosecutor, David Walsh, objected and the trial 
court refused to make such inquiry, as in Batson. 
While this case involves striking only one Hispanic 
and Batson involved striking four black persons on the venire, 
the fact that so few Hispanics are included in jury venires in 
Salt Lake County requires that prosecutors be barred from using 
racially motivated grounds for striking any venireperson. The 
trial court heard evidence that only 2.16% of venirepersons in 
all criminal trials in Salt Lake County from January through 
March 1983 had Spanish surnames while Hispanics represented 
4.98% of the population at that time (T. 92). 
Some states have held that the use of peremptory 
challenges by the prosecution to exclude persons from a petit 
jury on the basis of race deprived defendants of their right to 
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trial by jury drawn fairly from the community. In Commonwealth 
v. Soares, 387 N. E. 2d 499 (Mass. 1979), a case in which a 
prosecutor peremptorily challenged twelve of thirteen black 
members of the venire, the court held that such a systematic 
use of peremptory challenges in a case denied a defendant his 
right to trial by a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the 
community. 
In People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (1978) the Supreme 
Court of California held that a prosecutor's use of peremptory 
challenges to remove each and every Black from the jury 
violated the defendant's right to a jury drawn from a 
respesentative cross-section of the community. In the instant 
case the prosecutor struck without legitimate cause the only 
Hispanic and thus the Appellant's right under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution to a trial by an 
impartial jury was violated. 
This court quoted People v. Wheeler in State v. Ball, 
685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984) which reversed a conviction for 
Driving Under the Influence: 
We agree with the California Supreme 
Court, which said: In practice, a party 
will use a peremptory challenge only when 
he believes that the juror he removes may 
be consciously or unconsciously biased 
against him, or that his successor may be 
less biased. 
To say that peremptories will ordinarily 
be exercised only in cases of bias, 
however, does not clarify the kinds of 
bias upon which the challenge may 
permissibly be based. In contrast to the 
limited list of events authorizing a 
challenge for cause on the ground of 
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implied bias (Pen. Code, §1074), the law 
recognizes that a peremptory challenge may 
be predicated on a broad spectrum of 
evidence suggestive of juror partiality. 
The evidence may range from the obviously 
serious to the apparently trivial, from 
the virtually certain to the highly 
speculative. 
By contrast, when a party presumes that 
certain jurors are biased merely because 
they are members of an identifiable group 
distinguished on racial, religious, 
ethnic, or similar grounds—we may call 
this "group bias"—and peremptorily 
strikes all such persons for that reason 
alone, he not only upsets the demographic 
balance of the venire but frustrates the 
primary purpose of the representative 
cross-section requirement. That purpose, 
as we have seen is to achieve an overall 
impartiality by allowing the interaction 
of the diverse beliefs and values the 
jurors bring from their group 
experiences. Manifestly if jurors are 
struck simply because they may hold those 
very beliefs, such interaction becomes 
impossible and the jury will be dominated 
by the conscious or unconscious prejudices 
of the majority. Seen in this light, the 
presumed group bias that triggered the 
peremptory challenges against its members 
is indistinguishable from the group 
perspective we seek to encourage by the 
cross-section rule. 
People v. Wheeler, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 
901-903, 583 P.2d at 760-761 (footnotes 
omitted). 
Ball at 1059. 
In this case, in light of Mr. Lopez' voir dire responses, and 
all other known information, it seems that the only reason Mr. 
Lopez was stricken was because he is a Hispanic, and therefore, 
unacceptable to the state's attorney who was prosecuting a 
Hispanic and whose victim is white. An all-white jury assures 
the prosecutor that the defendant is perceived as different 
from them and enhances the likelihood that jury members will 
identify with the white victim, a very real advantage to the 
state. 
i r\ 
Group bias should not be used as a legitimate reason 
to peremptorily challenge a potential juror. The consequence 
of this process is that prosecutors are allowed to have jurors 
whom they expect will be inherently suspect of a minority 
defendant, if not consciously or unconsciously biased against 
him. In fact the Salt Lake County Attorney Trial Manual 
published in 1978 advises prosecutors that minorities per se 
are poor jurors for blue collar crimes but good for white 
collar crimes (Addendum D). Because the number of minorities 
who are called to jury duty is very small, almost never more 
than one per panel, the four peremptories granted the state 
will always be sufficient to remove every minority venireperson. 
In this case Appellant met the evidentiary burden of 
Batson and this case should therefore be reversed and remanded 
for a new trial, unless arguments in other points warrant 
reversal and cause the court to enter a verdict of guilty of 
Burglary, a felony of the second degree. Limiting the 
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to preclude racial 
discrimination will not undermine the legitimate exercise of 
peremptory challenges. If a prosecutor can provide a neutral 
explanation for challenging racial minorities, , those 
challenges should be allowed. Because facially the stricken 
venireperson was excluded solely because of his race, the 
prosecutor would not disclose the reason for the challenge, and 
the court would not order it, this Court must conclude that 




INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED BY THE 
STATE TO ESTABLISH GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. 
The jury found the Appellant guilty of aggravated 
robbery, aggravated burglary and aggravated assault (R. 
32-34). The evidence which was presented at trial was 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Mr. Cantu asserted throughout the trial that 
while he had been in the victim's home earlier in the evening 
that he had left when he heard snoring and that he knew others 
had returned (T. 597). He admitted taking a coat from the 
victim's home because his was not warm enough (T. 583). The 
only evidence placing the Appellant in the victim's home at the 
time of the attack was the victim's identification and that 
identification was so faulty that it does not support the 
verdict. 
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 442, 444 (1983) this 
Court stated " . . . notwithstanding the presumptions in favor 
of the jury decision this court still has the right to review 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict." The 
Court also noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence (viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict) is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime for which he was 
convicted. Id. (Citations omitted). 
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In State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 234-235 (1980) the 
dissent noted: 
If the circumstances essential for conviction 
are ambiguous and consistent with the 
innocence of the accused, then this court must 
hold as a matter of law that there is no 
substantial evidence to support the guilt of 
the accused. 
This standard is in accordance with the Due Process 
requirements which prohibit a criminal conviction in all cases 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which a defendant is 
charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence 
presented to place him at the home of the victim at the time of 
the assault. The only evidence which exclusively supported 
that proposition was the identification of the victim, Adelia 
PipPY/ an elderly woman in her bed in a darkened bedroom in 
the middle of the night (T. 229). 
The problems inherent in eyewitness identification 
have been the subject of much discussion. The late Felix 
Frankfurter, former Supreme Court Justice said: 
What is the worth of identification 
testimony even when uncontradicted? The 
identification of strangers is proverbially 
untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony 
are established by a formidable number of 
instances in the records of English and 
American trials. These instances are recent 
— not due to the brutalities of ancient 
criminal procedure . . . . 
Evidence as to identity based on personal 
impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps of 
all classes of evidence the least to be relied 
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upon and therefore, unless supported by other 
facts, an unsafe basis for the verdict of a 
jury. Frankfurter, The Trial of Sacco and 
Vanzetti. 
The unreliability of eyewitness identification has 
been well documented in numerous law review articles in recent 
years.1 
Ipid Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony 
on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 
969 (1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibility of 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 461 (1978); 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence; Flaws and Defenses, 7 No. Ky. 
L. Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental Studies of 
Face Identification 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977); Use of 
Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 Crim. L.Q. 
361 (1979). Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Public Defender 
Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976); Yarmey, The Psychology 
of Eyewitness Testimony (1979); Buckhout, Determinants of Eyewitness 
Performance on a Lineup, 1974 Bull. Psychonomic Soc'y 191; Buckhout, 
Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in the Courtroom, Crim. 
Def., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 5-9; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 
Scientific Am., Dec. 1974, at 23; Ellis, Davies & Shepherd, 
Experimental Studies of Face Identification, Nat'l J. Crim. Def. 219 
(1977); Levin & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: 
The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1079 (1973); Luce, 
The Neglected Dimension in Eyewitness Identification, Crim., Def., 
May-June 1977, at 5-8; Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness 
Credibility: Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law. 
563, 575-85 (1976). 
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Thus the Appellant contends that the evidence in this 
trial suggested that it was "inherently improbable" that he 
committed the crime. The victim failed to identify Mr. Cantu 
in an eight-person lineup, at which the participants stood, 
walked, turned, and then spoke the phrase Mrs. Pippy remembered 
her assailant having said. She remarked that she did not 
believe the face of the man who hurt her was there (Addendum A, 
p. 26). However, one hour later, at the Preliminary Hearing, 
with Appellant seated alone next to defense counsel, Mrs. Pippy 
pointed at him, identified him, and shouted, "I'll never forget 
his face" (T. 337). At Preliminary Hearing and at Trial the 
victim claimed that the reason she failed to indicate that she 
recognized anyone in the linup was because she was not one 
hundred percent certain (T. 334). Yet, at the linup she was 
asked only if she recognized anyone to which she replied that 
she did not. (See Addendum A, lineup transcript). 
In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) the 
Supreme Court set a standard for evaluating pretrial 
photographic identifications which are allegedly "unnecessarily 
suggestive and conducive to misidentification " The Supreme 
Court stated: 
. . . each case must be considered on its 
own facts, and that convictions based on 
eyewitness idenfication at trial following a 
pretrial identification by photograph will 
be set aside on that ground only if the 
photographic identification procedure was so 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to 
a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification. 
390 U.S. at 384. 
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The Court also stated in that case: 
. . • The chance of misidentification is 
also heightened if the police indicate to 
the witness that they have other evidence 
that one of the persons pictured committed 
the crime. Regardless of how the initial 
misidentification comes about, the witness 
thereafter is apt to retain in his memory 
the image of the photograph rather than of 
the person actually seen, reducing the 
trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or 
courtroom identification. 
Ld. at 383-384. 
In this case after the victim had said that she 
believed that a photograph of the Appellant was that of her 
assailant, a police officer indicated that she had indeed 
identified the suspect in the case (T. 527). The victim then 
expressed relief that she had picked the right one. In this 
case the victim, who had been unable to identify Mr. Cantu in a 
lineup, did pick out a photo that she thought was her assailant 
(T. 527). However, the victim's identification was so shaky 
that Detective John Lomax, police officer in charge of the 
investigation, said that he would not have tried to get a 
criminal complaint on her identification alone (T. 526). 
The victim indicated in her initial description that 
the assailant did not have long hair or a beard yet testimony 
of Oclries Chacon indicated that Mr. Cantu had long hair and a 
beard at the time of the attack and that he usually had a beard 
and long hair (T. 474). At the lineup that is how he appeared 
and the victim, Mrs. Pippy, was unable to identify him (T. 331). 
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The array of photographs shown to her by Detective 
Lomax was also impermissibly suggestive in that four of the six 
photos were of men with long hair while the victim's 
description of the assailant was clearly that he had "normal" 
hair (T. 302). In this case Mr. Cantu normally wore his hair 
long and the reason the victim was shown a photo of him with 
short hair was because the photo was taken while the Appellant 
was in custody for an unrelated matter and short hair was 
required by the institution. 
During trial Appellant's cousel showed the victim the 
only other photo of a man with short hair from the original 
photo array. The victim looked at the photo and said, "This is 
the man" (T. 300). The victim further stated she thought the 
picture was of Mr. Cantu (T. 300). The photo she identified 
was not of the Appellant and when Appellant's counsel expressed 
surprise, the victim retreated and tried to explain away her 
choice with the implausible statement that she meant this was 
just a man she had seen on the street (T. 300) (See Addendum 
F). This does not seem a logical response during trial 
questioning on the identity of her attacker and shows the 
inconsistencies and the doubt of the victim's identification of 
Mr. Cantu as her assailant. Mrs. Pippy also said her attacker 
had no accent (T. 282), yet the court noted for the record that 
the Appellant has a Spanish accent (T. 758). 
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This Court stated in State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 
1352 (1979): 
But the circumstances of the individual case 
should be scrutinized carefully by the trial 
court to see whether in the identification 
procedures there was anything done which 
should be regarded as so suggestive or 
persuasive that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the identification was not a 
genuine product of the knowledge and 
recollection of the witness, but was 
something so distorted or tainted that in 
fairness and justness the guilt or innocence 
of an accused should not be allowed to be 
tested thereby. 
In this case there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
victim's identification was not a genuine product of her 
knowledge and recollection but was instead based on an improper 
photo lineup, Mr. Cantu's photo had been logically included 
because his identification had been found in a jacket left in 
the home sometime that evening; however, hair length, rather 
than facial features, was a critical characteristic of the 
attacker and it was improper to have included primarily men 
with longer hair, who were perfunctorily excluded from 
consideration, enhancing the probability that Appellant or the 
one remaining short-haired subject would be selected. As one 
might expect from this unfortunately capricious yet determined, 
angry victim, at trial her fundamental doubt about who attacked 
her caused her to select the other short-haired man's photo as 
the assailant, retreating only after the cross-examination 
pointed out what she had done. 
- 20 -
Another weakness in the state's case concerned the 
testimony of officer Hanks who stated that he had 
conscientiously followed the footprints left in the snow from 
the victim's house to a house in which Miguel Marcus was 
staying (T. 463). These footprints were in the opposite 
direction from Appellant's house (T. 451). Officer Hanks 
testified that he felt that Marcus had something to do with the 
crime (T. 467). Yet the investigating officer, Detective 
Lomax, did not follow up on this investigation by Officer 
Hanks. No check was made to see if Marcus had any police or 
juvenile record and no attempt was made to show the victim any 
photo of Marcus. This physical evidence suggests that the 
Appellant's version of what happened that night is entirely 
reasonable and that considering all the circumstances, there 
was insufficient evidence that Juan Cantu was in the home at 
the time of the attack. 
Given the limited physical description the victim was 
able to provide (which suggests an unreliability of any 
subsequent identification), the suggestive photographic array, 
the confirming statement by the police officer after her 
selection of Appellant, the failure of the victim to identify 
or recognize Appellant at an in-person lineup (after watching 
him and hearing him speak), her brazen selection of him in 
isolation as the defendant in a Preliminary Hearing an hour 
later, and her initial identification of another man's photo at 
trial as her attacker, it is clear that this elderly victim did 
not really know at all who had attacked her, but had relied 
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upon statements by police and the fact that the state had 
charged Mr. Cantu on her compelling but inaccurate statement, 
"I'll never forget his face." Petree ought to compel this 
Court to find the evidence insufficient to convict of 
aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, 
and order judgment entered, if appropriate, for burglary under 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended). 
POINT III 
THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY SHOULD NOT 
HAVE GONE TO THE JURY SINCE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS 
WERE NOT PROVEN. 
The Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended). That 
statute reads: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the 
first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be deemed to be 'in the course of 
committing a robbery1 if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, 
or in the immediate flight after the attempt 
or commission of a robbery. 
The robbery statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 (1953 as amended) 
states, "Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of 
personal property in the possession of another from his person 
or immediate presence, against his will, accomplished by means 
of force or fear." 
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The elements that must be proved, then, for aggravated 
robbery are: (1) that there was an intentional taking of 
personal property; (2) that the property was in the victim's 
possession; (3) that the taking was from the victim's person or 
immediate presence; (4) that the taking was accomplished by 
means of force or fear; and (5) that during the course of 
committing the robbery, the perpetrator used a firearm, knife, 
deadly weapon, or facisimile thereof, or caused serious bodily 
injury upon another. The evidence presented at trial did not 
establish each of these necessary elements. 
At trial no evidence was presented that anything was 
taken from the person of the victim or from her immediate 
presence by means of force or fear. This case can be 
distinguished from this court's holding in State v. Ulibarri, 
668 P.2d 568 (1983). In that case a person leaving a store was 
stopped by a clerk and asked to pay for beer. The defendant in 
that case then put his hand in his pocket, acted as a gunman 
and said, "Everything's cool, hold it there or I'll blow you 
away." in Ulibarri this court held that when the owner of a 
premises takes precautions against thievery and his opposition 
is overcome as he interposes himself to prevent the theft, the 
use of force concurrent or concomitant with the taking 
constituted robbery. In Uliberri the theft occurred in the 
presence of the victim which distinguishes it from the present 
case. 
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In this case any taking occurred in the other rooms of 
the home, not in the bedroom where the victim was assaulted, 
and Mrs. Pippy was unaware of such taking (T. 241). The victim 
also testified that she heard no sounds from other parts of her 
home after she was attacked (T. 278). 
In considering the forceful taking element, 
commentators provide this insight: " The offense is robbery 
only if the force, actual or constructive, is part of the res 
gestae of the larceny." (citations omitted.) 
Wharton's Criminal Law, 12th Ed., Robbery §559 says: 
Robbery is not committed when the victim is 
not aware that the defendant has taken the 
victim's property until after the defendant 
has done so and is leaving. 
When the defendant is able to take 
possession of the property without the use 
of force or fear but then employs force or 
fear in order to keep the property or to 
effect his escape, it is generally held that 
his offense is not robbery. (citations 
omitted.) 
State v. Aldershorf, 556 P.2d 371 (Kansas 1976) noted 
Wharton's observations that there was conflict in some states 
because of the uncertainty as to when the taking is completed. 
Some cases have held that the snatching of 
property from the presence of an owner or his 
agent and a use of force or intimidation in 
carrying it away constitutes robbery, usually 
on the theory that the taking was not effected 
until the property was carried away, and any 
violence used in making an escape after the 
snatching was in effect violence in the 
taking. The problem raised by these cases has 
been met in some jurisdictions by statutes 
which define robbery so as to include the use 
of force to resist the retaking of the 
property. (citations omitted.) 
556 P.2d at 374. Ulibarri, a per curiam opinion muddied this 
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issue in Utah because it held that if force is used to prevent 
the retaking of property, a robbery has occurred, despite the 
language of Utah's robbery statute that does not include force 
in the retaking as robbery. 
The Aldershorf court then laid down this test: 
"We believe that the test should be whether or 
not the taking of the property has been 
completed at the time the force or threat is 
used by the defendant. This must of necessity 
be determined from the factual circumstances 
presented in the particular caes before the 
court." 
556 P.2d at 375. 
In this case no force was used against the victim in 
order to take items from her home by means of force or fear. 
Neither was there any attempt to take by force such items. The 
victim was assaulted and asked if she had any gold or silver. 
When she replied that she did not she was beaten, apparently in 
anger and frustration. Any taking occurred before the assault 
of the victim (as she remained conscious and heard nothing from 
the other rooms afterwards) and no effort was made by the 
victim to prevent the taking. This case is clearly different 
than Ulibarri in that nothing was taken from the victim's 
presence.Therefore neither a robbery nor aggravated robbery 
occurred. The jury showed its concern in this regard by asking 
for a definition of immediate presence (T. 713). 
Thus it was error to allow the charge of aggravated 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING AN AIDING AND 
ABETTING INSTRUCTION WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
OF SUCH ACTIVITY. 
Appellant admitted during the trial that he had 
entered the home of the victim earlier in the evening 
of the attack (T. 583). He admitted leaving his coat there 
because he needed a warmer coat. However no evidence was 
presented that Juan Cantu was present in the house at the 
time of the assault other than the victim'a unreliable 
eyewitness identification. 
in State v. Pacheco, 27 Utah 2d 881, 495 P.2d 808 
(1972) this court stated that it was prejudicial error to give 
an aiding and abetting instruction where there was no evidence 
of aiding and abetting. Although that case was decided before 
the enactment of Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 (1978), this court in 
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (1982) reaffirmed the rule 
that "it is prejudicial error to give an aiding and abetting 
instruction if there is no evidence of such activity" 652 P.2d 
at 945. 
In this case the only evidence placing the Appellant 
in the victim's house at the time of the assault was the 
victim's eyewitness testimony. If the Appellant was the person 
the victim saw then he would have to be guilty as a principal 
and not one who is criminally liable as an aider and abettor. 
Appellant's counsel made a timely objection (T. 649) to the 
aiding and abetting instruction (Jury Instruction No. 28) which 
was given to the jury (Addendum E). 
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In State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980) this 
court defined an accomplice as "one who is also criminally 
liable for the conduct charged." Jj3. at 1166. In state v. 
Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972) this court said: 
...Furthermore, mere presence combined with 
knowledge that a crime is about to be 
committed where the person contributes 
nothing to the doing of the act, will not of 
itself constitute one an accomplice. 
Id. at 665. 
In this case although Appellant might have known that 
others were going back to Mrs. Pippy's home to steal property, 
as his testimony indicated, he did nothing to instigate, 
encourage or assist anyone in committing the crime, and refused 
to leave his house to go with them (T. 597). 
In State v. Kerekes, this court stated: 
Nevertheless, even if one has lent aid and 
encouragement, voluntary abandonment of his 
participation prior to the commission of the 
crime relieves him of criminal liability for 
its commission providing the abandonment was 
communicated to the remaining parties and 
occurred prior to a time when the crime had 
become so inevitable that its commission 
could not reasonably be stayed. 
622 P.2d at 1166. 
In this case Appellant had abandoned the act and had 
communicated to the remaining parties before they returned to 
the victim's house that he wanted nothing to do with 
burglarizing a house where someone was present (T. 588). 
Appellant did enter the victim's house earlier in the evening 
and is guilty of burglary. There was no evidence offered to 
prove that Appellant re-entered the house at the time the 
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victim was assaulted other than the victim's suspect eyewitness 
testimony. 
This case requires especially close scrutiny of the 
aiding and abetting instruction in light of the rather tenuous 
identification of Mr. Cantu. If the eyewitness identification 
is to be believed, then the Appellant would be guilty as a 
principal and the abetting instruction would have been 
unnecessary and prejudicial, providing an unsupported, yet 
alternate, basis for conviction. If the eyewitness testimony 
was not believed then the jury may have convicted the Appellant 
as an aider and abettor even though there was no evidence that 
he did in fact aid and abet. 
In Napier v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 75, 206 S.W.2d 53 
(1947) the court said (about jury instructions): 
"A trial court, especially a regular circuit 
judge, wields a tremendous influence on the 
minds of jurors; and it is not unusual for a 
jury to conclude that 'technical' rules of 
evidence tend to suppress 'facts' which in 
their opinion should be introduced in 
evidence; and when the court instructs them 
upon an issue concerning which no evidence 
was introduced, jurors sometimes gather the 
impression that the court is attempting to 
point out the 'true facts' in the 
unauthorized instruction. Oftentimes this 
results in the jury's 'reading between the 
lines' of the evidence and arriving at an 
erroneous conclusion. Such being true, the 
court meticulously should follow the 
evidence in instructing the jury." 
206 S.W.2d at 57. 
In this case it is possible that the jury believed that there 
was evidence of aiding and abetting because of the jury 
instruction even though no such evidence was presented. 
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As it is impossible to determine under which theory 
the jury convicted the Appellant, this erroneous instruction 
requires these convictions be reversed. It seems inappropriate 
to allow the state to argue throughout the trial that the 
Appellant is the one who assaulted the victim because the 
victim positively identified the Appellant but then say to the 
jury that even if the Appellant wasn't the one who actually 
assaulted the victim that he should nevertheless be found 
guilty. Either Juan Cantu attacked the victim or there is no 
evidence that he was in the house at the time. Allowing Jury 
Instruction No. 28 unduly prejudiced him and reversal is 
required. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ARRESTING JUDGMENT 
OR MODIFYING JUDGMENT TO GUILTY AND MENTALLY ILL 
WHEN APPELLANT WAS FOUND TO BE MENTALLY ILL PRIOR 
TO SENTENCING, 
During the course of the trial Appellant's counsel 
became aware that Mr. Cantu was showing signs of mental 
illness. When his symptoms increased in severity after his 
conviction, defense counsel asked that an alienist be 
appointed. The court consented and Dr. Breck LeBegue was 
appointed. He evaluated Appellant and found him to be mentally 
ill (See Addendum B) . 
Thereafter, Appellant's counsel made a motion to 
arrest judgment under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-23 (1982 Supp.) 
which provides: 
§77-35-23. Rule 23 - Arrest of judgment. At 
any time prior to the imposition of 
sentence/ the court upon its own initiative 
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may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, 
arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, 
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there 
is other good cause for the arrest of 
judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court 
may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the 
offense charged is anew or retried, or may 
enter any other order as may be just and 
proper under the circumstances. 
In this case Appellant is mentally ill as defined in 
Utah Code Ann. §64-7-28(1) (1953 as amended), which provides: 
(1) "Mental illness" means a psychiatric 
disorder as defined by the current 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders which substantially impairs a 
person's mental, emotional, behavioral, or 
related functioning. 
In this case, Utah Code Ann. §77-35-23 required the 
trial court to arrest judgment because Appellant was mentally 
ill at a time prior to the imposition of sentence. 
Appellant requested that judgment be arrested or, 
failing that, to modify the judgment from guilty to guilty and 
mentally ill under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §77-35-21.5 
(1983 Supp.) to make Appellant elligible for the treatment Dr. 
LeBegue recommended. The trial court's denial was error under 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-23 and this court should set aside the 
judgment and order a new trial, unless the resolution of other 
issues compels a more favorable result. 
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CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant 
seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of his case to the 
District Court for dismissal of some or all charges and/or a 
new trial, or a finding of guilty of burglary, a second degree 
felony, (or guilty and mentally ill). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <s%JL day of July, 1986. 
JO^AROL NESSET-SALE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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£ I 2 ^ E D I N G S 
MS. NESSET-SALE: We could begin now. I'm Jo Carol 
Nesset-Sale. I have requested this line up. 
In addition to myself, David Walsh, Deputy County 
Attorney, is present, as well as Sargeant Mallas from the 















flR, WALSH: And the record should also reflect that 
you have arranged, have you not, Jo Carol, the arrangement as 
you want then to be in? 
!<TS . NESSEx-SALE: Yes. I have placed the eight 
gentlemen in the positions that I'd like them to be in. They 
•ill each vnw in turn give us their name, age, height and 
weight, aft^r Khich I might make some additional comments 
about tne 3 irie up. 
There are no other persons other than the named 
persons presently in the room, except for the court reporter. 
.MR. WALSH: That's correct. And let's start out, 
we're all going to have to do the same thing, we're going to 
ssk you tc keep your hands out at your sides. So let's start 
out uov and all do that if you would, please. 
21 j Gentleman number one, would you step forward, 
i 




GC"TLEf'AN NO. 1: My narue is Joe K. Anderson. 
PR. WALSH: Your height, sir? 
COHLEflAN HO. 1: Is five eight. 
COMPUTERISED TRANSCRIPT 
Excuse me? 
Are you white, are you Mexican? 
No, Ifm not Mexican. 
Are you white; do you consider 
MP, I*ALSH: And your weight? 
GENTLEMAN NO. 1: About 162. 
MR, rALSH: And your age? 
GENTLEMAN NO. 1: 21. 
MR. WALSH: Thank you. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: Mr. Anderson, are you an ethnic 
miner ity? 
GENTLEMAN NO. J.: 
MS- NESSET-SALE: 
GENTLEMAN NO. 1; 
MS, NESSET-SALE; 
yourr3«lf caucasion? 
No, I don't. 
Uhat are you? 
I'm Italian. 
Okay. All right. 
MR. r,;ALSH: Gentleman number two. 
GENTLEMAN NO. 2: Eddie Ramos, five ten and a half, 
165, 38. 
MR. WALSH: All right. Thank you, sir. 
MF, NESSET-SALE: And if you are a minority, would 
you ad 1 if JOJ are. If you are Mexican, if you are white, if 
you ace Italian, 0*'jy. 
MR. i.ALSHi Are you, sir? 
GENTLEMAN NO. 2: Chicano. 
CENTIEMAN NO. 1 
MS. NLS3ET-SALE 




MR. ,T7\LSH: All ric,ht. 
MS. HESSET-SALE: Number three. 
GENTLEMAN NO. 3: Runel Juan Martinez, five eight I 
a naif, lA'j
 T 32, Spanish. ! 
MR. WALSH: Thank you. Gentleman number four. 
GENTLEMAN NO. 4: Tony DeHerrerar, five eight, 33, ' 
, Chic^ro. 
MR. ' ALSH: Thank you. Gentleman number five. I 
GENTLEMAN NO. 5: Albert Lozano, I'm 32 years old, | 
five 11, 160 pounds, and I'm Mexican. | 
MR, WALSH: Thank y° u/ sir« I 
MS. NESSET-3?LE: Number six. I 
GENTLEMAN NO. 6: Juan Cantu. 
I 
MR„ WALSH: Your age? J 
GENTLEMAN NO. 6: 35. 
IIP. WALSH: vour height? 
GENTLEMAN' NO. 6: Six foot. I 
! 
MR. WALSH: Your weight? I 
GENTLEMAN NO. 6: 150. j 
MP. WALSH: All right. I 
MS. NESSET-SALE: Are you Spanish? | 
GEHlLEMAli NO. 6: Yes. ; 
MR. WALSH: All right. Can we keep our hands to our 
r-r, aentleiron, please. I 
I 
Gentlenan number seven. I 
CONPUTERIZED II-ADSCRIPT 
GENTLEMAN NO. 7: My name is Joe G. Trujillo, age 
2 | 22, I <*eigh 140, and I'm Chicano. 
3 
4 
MR. WALSH: Your height, sir? 
GENTLEMAN NO. 7: Six one. 
MR« WALSH: All right. Thank you. Gentleman number 
eight • 
GENTLEMAN MO. 8: Mike Valdez, 155, 18, five nine, 
Chicane. 
MR. WALSH: Thank you, sir. 
MS, NESSET-SALE: My observations about the line up, 
and if I could just see yourv arms, if you would keep your arms 
at the side, is that number one is quite tattooed on both 
arms, ^specially the left arm. Number three is tattooed en 
the Vft forearm and hand. Number seven is tattooed on ti*e 
inside of the left forearm. They appear to be the only 
visible tattooes. As far as facial hair, number one has 
goateo and mustache, two, a full mustache, three, full 
mustache, four, the same, five, the same, six, a mustache and 
sort :•* a straggly short beard, seven is clean shaven as is 
number eighth All gentlemen have dark brown hair, although 
number six is considerably grayed. Number four has a little 
bit o* gray, r\rl much. And the rest are dark hair. 
Fhen the victim, alleged victim arrives, she's not 
present ypt. icu will not repeat what you've just done with 
.your name and height. That was just for the record. What you 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
7 
wilJ dor we'll have you do now, we'll have you practice since 
she's not here. And I'm going to have number one demonstrate 
what v'ou are going to do. If we do it and just listen 
carefully and be serious, it won't take us long to get through 
the line up. 
I'll say number one, will you take one step forward. 
Would ye: make a quarter turn to the left, quarter turn, 
anotherf face forward. . Number one, will you now walk to the 
spot in front of number eight, and face forward when you get 
there Would you now make those same quarter turns to the 
left, back forward* Would you now walk back to the spot in 
frcpt of number one and face forward. Step back, sir. 
Number two, step forward. Would you make quarter 
turns to the left. Would you now walk, sir, to the spot in 
front of number eight and face forward. 
NiKuber one, hands at your side, please. Thank you. 
Now slow quarter turns to the left, Eddie. Would 
you now walk back to the spot in front of number two and face 
forward. Step back. 
Number three, step forward. W7ait a minute. Face 
forward. You've got to keep your face looking ahead. Okay. 
Now, would you make slow quarter turns to the left looking up. 
That's good. Would you now walk to the spot in front of 
number eight and face forward. Slow quarter turns to the 
left, sir. Vould you now walk back to the spot in front of 
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numbet three rind face forward. Step back. Thank you. 
Number four, step forward. Slow quarter turns to 
the left, sir. Walk to the spot in front of number eight, 
face forward. Slew quarter turns to the left. Face forward. 
Walk back to the spot in front of number four and face 
forward. Step back. 
Nov five through eight are going to be walking in 
front to the spot in front of number one. Okay. 
Number five, will you step forward. Slow quarter 
turns. Face forward again. Would you now walk to the spot in 
front cf number one, sir. Face forward. Slow quarter turns 
around. Fare forward. Would you now walk back to the spot in 
front nf number five. Face forward. Step back. 
number six, step forward. Slow quarter turns TZC the 
Left- Keep neing, that's too slow. But don't stay there all 
aay. Now walk to the spot in front of number one and face 
forwaid. Slew aa.ir*"pr turns to the left, sir. Keep going, 
again, again, Would you walk to the spot in front of number 
six* Ftep back. 
Now we shouldn't have to say quarter turn left, 
quarter turn left, quarter turn left. Just once you've 
started quarter turns, stop briefly, continue to turn. Okay. 
number se^en, step forward. Hands at your side. 
Quarter turn** around. Walk to the spot in front of number 
one. Face rorvard. Quarter turns around. Walk to the spot 
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in fr^nt of nuirher seven. Face forward. Step back, please 
thank you. 
And number eight, quarter turns. Face forward. 
Walk Lo the spot in front of number one, sir. Face forward. 
Quarter turns around. Back to the spot in front of number 
eight* Step back. 
Nov, if you are asked to say anything, you will do 
that when you first step, forward. It will be step forward, 
repeat after mer and the statement will be given to you. And 
of course you'll have a chance to practice the statement so 
that we can irake sure everybpdy is being appropriately 
serious. This is involving a first degree felony, so itfc a 
sericur matter. And we appreciate your willingness to be 
series about it, 
naP c-he arrived yet? 
KR. WALSH: Yes. 
PS, NESSET-SALE: Okay. 
tlR. WALSH: One other note, gentlemen. That is, 
don't do anything to draw attention to yourself. We want 
everybody to look the same as much as possible. And we want j 
all of vou to act the same as much as oossible. 
NESSET-SALE: She's not here at this moment, 









l j MS, NESSF'I-SALE: 7:e d o n ' t know i f t h e a c t u a l p e r s o n 
2 IP involved. That's one of the things we're trying to find 
3 J out, i^ if an identification can be made, 
4 i David, is there any special statement? 
5 !IF. KALSH: I don't know. I'll go ask her. But 
6 | before we dof Jo Carol, do you have any objection to the 
7 J constitution of the line up? 
8 (MS. NESSET-SALE: The line up is imperfect as all 
9 line ups arer especially I think numbers one, two and eigftt 
10 are not nearly as Hispanic looking as the rest of the line up. 
11 But I'm also satisfied that Sargeant Mallas has done the best 
12 , he car do with the jail population. So I am satisfied with 
13 I proce^ina rith the line up. 
14 vr. rALSHs No objection to that? All right. 
15 Ore other thing. I would prefer myself to co it 
16 * since sh^'s going to be my witness. I would like to have 
17 theM, I irear giv? them directions. 
18 j VS. NESSE1-SALE: No problem. But would you find 
19 j cut fi^st if there is something to be said before they just —* 
20 MR. WALSH: I will. Let me just ask Sergeant :or 
21 j the »ecotd, Sergeant, is this the best we can do with the 
22 j population? 
23 | SFROEAN! MALLAS: It is, under the circumstances. 
24 I Being P taller Hispanic, why they are usually shorter, and it j 
25 j was hcu-d encugh to get these people. 
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MR, KALSH: Thatfs all we need to get on the record. 
MS- NESSET-SALE: Just hang loose while we find out 
if there is a statement. If so, we'll practice that. 
Number four, have you ever been in the military? 
GENTLEMAN MO. 4: No. 
MS- ?JESSET-SALE: You carry yourself as though ycu 
are an ex-marine. I just wondered. A poster child, perhaps, 
of the marine. It will .just be a minute. He's just going to 
find out if there is a statement. When you come back, make 
sure you are on the same number you are on now. Now that I've 
played musical people. 
(Off the record.) 
f:S. NESSET-SALE: Any statements? f 
i 
MR. WALSH: Yes. "Where's your silver and where's 
! 
your end, you old son of a bitch." I 
I!S. NESSET-SALE: And than is a statement made cy | 
the same percon who hit her? j 
MR. WALSH: Apparently. 
KS. NESSET-SALE: I want to make sure. Can we bring 
h3r in? 
(Off the record.) 
MR. !fALci:: Would you tell us, Mrs. Pippy, your full 1 
naire, please. Ke'rr on the record. Ke have a court reporter 
'>iitii -JS today and she's going to record the proceedings. So 
i 
would you tell us your name, your full name and your address. ( 
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lj T!i WITNESS: My full name, you mean maiden name 
2 j also? 
3 MR, WALSH: No, just your first and last name now. 
4 7HE WITNESS: Adelia, A-d-e-1-i-a, Pippy, P-i-p-p-y. 
5 MR. WALSH: Okay. And you are the victim in this 
6 case? 
7 j THE WITNESS: Yes. 
8 MR. WALSH: I.guess we donft need the address. 
9 j Okay. 
10 j Nov;, Mrs, Pippy/ were some statements made to you 
11 j during the course of this crime? 
12 1HF PI1KES3: Oh yes. I 
13 MR. v'ALSH: Was more than one person involved? 
14 i THE KlThESS: There were two in my bedroom. i 
15 1 HP. VALSH: All right. And there was a statement or j 
| I 
16 a nun.her of statements made to you? 
I I 
17! THE WITNESS: Oh yes, but they were all by the one 
18 j chat hit ^e on the head. ' 
19 i MR. KALSH: They were one and the same person that ! 
20 made the statements and also hit you on the head; is that 
21 true? I 
22 THE WITNESS: (Witness nodding head.) ; 
23 IIS. NESSE^ -SALE: Can you tell me, did anybody else | 
24 2£r.a^
 f any ct the other perpetrators, other than the one who ' 





lj THE wiTKESS: No. The one standing to the side, I 
2 | J coked tniouch my eye and I could see he had Levi's on. I 
i 
3 | could see a little bit of black hair. But I could not see the 
4 j race. And I dicln't turn my head because somewhere throughout 
5 1 my lifetime I've heard that if you are ever hit with a rock 
6 or anything in the temple, there are certain spots on your 
7 | head, that it would kill you, you know. 
8 j MR. WALSH: NQW the statement that was made, Mrs. 
9 J ?ippy, was what? 
10 j THE WITNESS: Ee said, "Where's your silver and your 
11 I uold," I says, "I don't have any. I live on Social 
12 j Security." 
13 j MR. VCAL3H: Okay. 
14 j MS, NESSET-SALE: Is that when you were hit, then, 
15 I :*£ter that statement was made? 
16 I THE FITNESS: And I was hit on the head and I looked 
17 I down end the club was broken right smack in two and laying on 
18 the carpet in the bedroom. 
19 MR, WALSH: Now, did he call you a name, Mrs. Pippy? 
20 j THE WITNESS: He called me an old son of a bitch. 
21 MR. UALSH: When did he say that in relationship to 
22 when he as-f-ed where your silver and your gold was? 
23 j THE WITNESS: It was before. 
24 i MR, WALSH: So how did it go, how were the 
25 statements made? 
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l l THE WITNESS: "You o l d son of a b i t c h , w h e r e ' s your 
2 silver and your <;old»,! 
3 | !*S. NESSET-SALE: And then you were struck when you 
4 J said you didn't have any; is that right? 
5 THE WITNESS: I was hit on the head. 
6 MR, hALSH: Okay. 
7 M S . NESSET-SALE: Okay. And there is no question 
8 | that the person who irade. that statement was the one who 
9 clubbed you, right? 
10 THE WITNESS: No question at all. 
11 M S. NESSET-SALE; Okay. So we'll need to have them 
12 p r a c M ce that • 
13 | MF B VALSH: Could we have you just step out again 
i 
i 
14 1 into the corridor, Mrs. Pippy? 
15 I THE WITNESS: You bet you. 
16 M S . NESSET-SALE: So the statement will b e , you old 
17 I sen of a bitch, wheel's your silver, I suppose, w h e r e f s your 
18 silver and ycur gold. Would you agree? 
19 PR. WALSH: Yes. 
20 MS, NESSET-SALE: Ckay. Could you have them come 
21 back? 
22 The victim has left the room, the record should 
2 3 note. 
24 Gentlemenf just to let you know before Mr. Walsh 
25 J says something, the victim is not in the room. It's just the 
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1 original group here, 
2 rher*3 was something that was said that each of you 
3 J is going to ptnotice. And Mr. Walsh will assist you and 
4 listen carefully to what was said. And for you to say it in 
5 J the manner that it was certainly said to the victim, okay? 
6 j MR. KALSH: Okay. Now this is the quotation and we 
7 want eich of ycu to say it when you step forward, when your 
8 turn comes th° first time. 
9 The statement is, "You old son of a bitch, where1s 
10 I your silver and your gold.1' 
11 MS. NESSET-SALE: Got it? Okay. 
12 MR, faALSH: "You old sen of a bitch, where1s your 
i 
13 • silver and your gold." Okay. 
14 Gentleman number one, would you step forward. 'Joule 
15 ycu sa\ that, please, 
16 I CEU1LENAN hO. 1: "Ycu old son of a bitch, where*s 
17 your silver and your gold." 
18 j MP. V'ALSh: All right. Thank you. Would you step 
19 back, please. 
20 | Centlenan number two. 
21 GENTLEMAN NO. 2: "You old son of a bitch, where1s 
22 j your silver and your gold." 
23 j MS. NESSFT-SALE: New let ire indicate this statement: 
24 was fHaid just before this woman, elderly woman was clubbed in 
25 the head. So it v;as probably an angry statement followcc by 
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1 ancuy *, iolence tcvard an old lady. So none of you should — 
2 I there is nothing funny whatever about this. So say it in that 
3 I kind of spirit, All right? 
4 MR. KALSH: Gentleman number two, do you want to try 
5 it again. 
6 GENTLEMAN NO. 2: "You old son of a bitch, where1s 
7 ycur silver and your gold." 
8 MS. HESSET-SALE: You've cot to be louder. We can't 
9 hear you. I 
10 GElsTLEMAN NC. 2: "You old son of a bitch, whero's I 
11 your silver and your gold." J 
I ! 
12 MS. HLSSET-SALE: Not serious enough, gentlemen. * 
13 ihis lady was clubbed v/ithin an inch of her life and she's i 
i 
14 entitled tc a fair chance to identify who might have done [ 
15 1 that, It cculd have been your grandmother clubbed. All i 
i 
16 right Please r;ey this seriously. « 
17 CErTIEMAII HO. 2: "You old son of a bitch, where's ! 
18 your silver and your gold." | 
19 J MR. rALSH: Okay. Thank you. | 
20 Gentleman number three. j 
21 GENTLEMAN NO. 3: "You eld son of a bitch, where's 
22 your silver and gold." ; 
23 MR. WALSK: Okay. "And your gold" ! 
24 j GEflTLEKAN HO. 3: "And your gold." 
25 1 MR. WALSH: All right. Thank you. 
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Gentleman number four. 
GENTLEMAN NO. 4: "You old son of a bitch, where's 
ycur silver and- gold." 
MR. WALSH: Okay. Say it with a little anger. 
You've get to irean it, guys. 
GEN'lLEMAN NO. 4: "You old son of a bitch, where's 
your geld ?nd silver." 
MP. WALSH: "Where's your silver and your gold." 
MS. NESSET-SALE: "Silver and your gold." 
TiR. KALSH: All right. Now you are going to r.^ ed to 
practice, 
GENTLEMAN NO. 5: "You old son of a bitch, where's 
ycur si Aver and your gold." 
MS. MESSET-SALE: Good. 
MR. v\ALSH: Okay. Sir, "You old son of a bitch, 
wh«rc'c ycur silver and your gold." 
GENI'.EMAN NO. 6: "You old son of a bitch, whe.-e's 
}our silver and ycur gold." 
MR, WALSH: Okay. Thank you. 
GENTLEMAN NO. 7: "You old son of a bitch, where*s 
your rilver and gold." 
MR. WALSH: "And your gold." 
GENTLEMAN 'TO. 7 : "And y o u r g o l d . " 
MR. '-.ALSH: A l l r i g h t . Thank y o u . 
GENTLEMAN NO. 8 : "Ycu o l d son o f a b i t c h , w h e r e ' s 
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your silver av& your gold." I 
IIS. HFSSEl'-SALE: Good. 
HP. WALSH: Thank you. j 
IIS. NESSET-SALE: Good. | 
MR. WALSH: Let me just tell you something, guys. j 
We've qot two people involved in this who have substantial 
rights at stake. We have a defendant and we have a victim. \ 
And both have certain amount of rights and certain amount of 
respect. When she's in this room we only get one chance. And j 
if somebody screws it up, we're all through. So don't screw J 
it up- j 
GFttHTEMAN NO. 3 : Can you b r i n g one of us a t a t ime j 
i 
jn h ^ e ; vcu]<i that be easier? 
US. NESSET-SALE: No. She needs to see all of ycu 
to cc^prre heights and weights and sizes. I 
PR. WALSH: Okay. I'm serious about it. A whole ' 
lot is at rtake. • 
hS. NESSET-SALE: I wanted to ask her one more 
question just about the voice before we do this. We probably j 
i 
ought to just have them troupe in. i 
MR. WALSH: Take them out, Sergeant. j 
riS. NESSET-SALE: Go on out. We'll have you back in 
just c minute* Ple^e keep your voices up so we hear you the I 
first- time. fhank you. ! 
(Off the record.) 
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MS, NESSET-SALE: Back to the same seat, Mrs. Pippy. 
Mrs. Fippy, one question I wanted to ask you before 
I 











the voice, age, sex, if there was any accent of any kind or 
dialect, you know, southern, Italian, Hispanic, white, 
anything? 
THE WITNESS: I don't remember any accent. I knew 
that it was a male voice and it was a male that hit me and it 
! 
was a man. It wasn't any child. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: All right. Thank you. 
MR. PALSH: Thank you. 
MF. NESSET-SALE: Okay, Sergeant. 
MR. WALSH: The record should reflect that we now 
14 I have ^e eight people who have beer* previously identified 
15 i present. v?« ^Iso have in the auditorium Mrs. Pippy. 
16 G?ntl^menf we1re going to now go through what we 
17 practiced befcrs* We'd ask you to keep your hands at your 
18 cide^ and n^t draw attention to yourselves. When we go 
19 ; through this, we'll do it one at a time as we did. And we'd 
20 ask you to say the statement, "You old son of a bitch, where's 
21 i your silver and your gold." 
I 
22 | O^ay. Gentleman number one, would you step forward, 
23 
24 i GENTLEMAN HO. 1: "You old son of a bitch, where's 
25 i your silver and your gold." 
pleasr: Would you riy that statement. 
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MR, WALSH: Would you make a quarter turn to your 
left, sir. Another quarter turn, another quarter turn, and 
another. Would iou step to the far end of the platform, 
pleaye. Would you make successive quarter turns, please. 
Would ycu please step to this end of the platform. Thank you. 
Gentleman number two, would you step forward anc 
say, "You old son of a bitch, where1s your silver and your 
gold." 
GENTLEMAN NO. 2: "You old son of a bitch, wherefs 
ycur silver and your cold." 
I 
MR. WALSH: Would you make successive quarter turns, i 
plea*---. Woul^ you step to the far end of the platform. Would i 
you Fake successive quarter turns. Would you please step back ; 
to this spotf sir. Thank you. [ 
Gentleman number three, would you step forward and i 
<ray, "'You eld son of a bitch, where's your silver and youi ! 
gold. "' 
GENTLEMAN NO. 3: "You old son of a bitch, where's 
your silver ar»d your gold." 
MR. WALSH: Okay. Would you please step to that far 
end. Thank vcuP sir. 
j 
Would you step forward, number four. Please say, i 
vr\ou old son of a bitch, where1 s your silver and your gold." | 
i 
GENTLEMAN NO. 4: "You old son of a bitch, where's ! 







HR. WALSH: Would you make successive quarter turns, 
p1ease• Would ycu p1o../c ?*t- . 
s i r . 
Gentleman number : : v wo a 1 d y o u st e p fo rwa rd and 
5 j s"i\" > • ' * „ w h e r e 1 s yoi lr si ] /ei: ai id 
6 J y o u - • : •. 
• 7 I ' GENTLEMAN MO. 5: "You old son of a bitch, where's 
8! your si ] ver and your goiu.J 
9 . !m WALSH: Thank you, s:r. 
1G | Gentleman number six, wc«Ic you step f o r w ^ - , 
1 1 j f v o u 1 6 v c; :I - a y f " Y o u i) ] c:i s o n o f a 1: • i t c i : * h e r e ' s 
12 ?nd ycur gold," 
13 | GENTLEMAN NO. 6: " You old son of a bltci: I, Where's 
14 | your silver silver and your gc- d." 
15 | HP., WALSH: Would you rake quarter •-urnr please. 
16 1 Would you step to this end of the platform, make successive 
17 quarter turns, pleas e , 0 k a y. W: 
18 j spot. Thank you, sir. 
19 j Gentleman number seven, wc, id you please step 
2 0 j f o r w a r d arid s a \ j: 1 e a s e , " i t c I: I , \ h e r e ' s \ o a r 
jSJUL M U _L U . | 
I 
silver and your gold." 
GENTLEMAN UQ. 1 : "You old sen of a bitch, where'£ 
your *_-j».i-er and ycu gold." 
24 I MR. WALSH; Would you make successive quart*- : lurns, 
Would you no'; please step tc this end of the plati^*.^. i.ai^ e 
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1 successive quarter turns, please. Thank you, sir. 
2 Gentleman number eight, would you step forward, 
3 plea?^, and say, "You old son of a bitch, where's your silver 
4 | md your gold." 
5 GENTLEMAN HO. 8: "You old son of a bitch, where's 
6 your silver and your gold." 
7 MP. WALSH: All right. Would you make successive 
8 quarter turns, please. .Would you step to this end of the 
9 platform. Make successive quarter turns, please, sir. All 
10 right. Thank you. I 
i 
11 Mrs. Pippy, if you recognize somebody there, can you I 




14 THE WITNESS: Yeah, I see the numbers. j 
t 
i 
15 MP. WALSH: All right. If you recognize somebody, 
16 j would you reiaember what their number is, and we're going co j 
17 have them leave new, j 
18 MS, NESSET-SALE: Let me just ask Mrs. Pippy, have i 
19 you nac! enough time to see them? Do you need them to go j 
20 throuoh the walk or the speech aoain, or have you had enough \ 
I " i 
21 I tims to see if you recognize anybody? ! 
I ~ I 
22 [ MR. WALSH: We need to know only, Mrs. Pippy, if j 
i 
23 mere time will help you. If it won't help you, that's the j 
24 1 only rhing vt need to know. We don't want any numbers. We 
25 just need — no you understand what I'm asking? If you need 
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some more time, we can give you some more time. That's, all 
we're talking about here , is if you need addi11ona 1 time. 
MS • NESSET-SALE i We can ' t pi ct< on \ : : f tl :ten: \ o\ 11 i mc 
have him do seme thine. But if you want: to see them all S"cep 
forward agai n o r v a 1 k a g a i n , we c a n d o t h a t, 01: I f y c u w o u 1 d 
1 ike to hear' eacI i oI: 11 i.ern speak t• :: ;:r • :: i i ai id irtake that statement 
again, we can have theirs, do that. Would that be helpful or 
have they helped you a 1 ] that the} can? 
THE WITKESS : Ther e i : ; c i: :i 1 y thr ee I 1 at ai " e — 
MS. NESSET-SALE; We can talk about them after 
they've left the room and you are given a card. Is it all 
? 
THE WITNESS; Oh yes. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: We have not yet had the 
photograph. I.' d i n 6 i c a t e . 
MR, WALSH: Maybe we better save them, for a minute 
until we finish this, 
MS . NESSE1 - SALE i Save i I i e i i i ! ;ack 11: ier< ; :, " 
Thank you, gentlemen. 
MR. WALSH 'vs. ?i>:'\ . t--. .• . ;, \ *
 : .. -his card. 
I den ' t know if you . i i :e give 
you my pen, And would you write you, name a- * ."- up of that, 
please. 




l j his. FESSET-SALE: I 'm s o r r y , I d i d n ' t hea r what she 
2 sa id. 
3 J MR. WALSH: I don't want to talk to you anymore. 
4 Let's just fill the card out. Okay? 
5 i THE WITNESS: Okay. 
6 MS, NESSET-SALE: And that's if you recognize any 
7 one or more persons, you should note the number down. 
8 MR. WALSH: We're just going to go through the first 
9 part here first. 
10 THE WITNESS: I couldn't say right now if I 
11 recognized any. 
12 j MR. WALSH: We're just going to fill in the top 
13 portirn of th^ card first. 
14 | 1HE WITNESS: Let's see, today is the 13th. 
15 MR. WALSH; August 13th, okay. You can leave tJr.e 
16 cas<= PMin^ er blank on that. Now, you see that box down at the 
17 1 bottom of the card there, Mrs. Pippy? Now, if there is 
18 j somebody that you recognized there as being the one who cid 
19 this to you that night, then write his number there. If you | 
20 | don't recognize anybody, then either v/rite a zero or just j 
! 
21 leave it- blank. I j 
22 7HE WITNESS: It didn't look like any of these guys, , 
23 j zjallJL~ 
24 I MR, WALSH: Okay. I d o n ' t v/ant you t o t a l k . I f you 
25 j neeo corr.e t i ^ e t o t h i n k , t h a t ' s f i n e . 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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lj THE WITNESS: Can I think a little o- — 
! 
2 j M S . N E S S E T - S A L E : And this ; .: rea,:y separate from 
I 
3J the series ci ( ^ i - v ' • • *' " a o o u : 
4 j the person who was . . .-* .... J ^ . • .^ ; ^ ce that 
statement **i; i !" . ;*«r. .cent:; _ that person freir t: : s 
group ,*•».•" ^ - * . -anf t 
identify that person ac ot;;.c ./: ...~ -.IO*.-. * ' Walsh 
says, that's when you JLeave I: clan./. » : put .. zero. 
THE WITNESS: Thi ; j gi /; / I s. iw — 
10 I MS. NESSET-SALE: . m sorr: T r r u hoar vcu. 
11 j THE WITNESS. :his idlcv; : n -.'.^  T.ucshct, r.is hair 
12 j was a Jittie dit:-. * * • 'his 
13 j line- up. 
14 j M S , N E S S E T - S A L E : :!' c'r.cerred . .re focusing on 
15 j the mug shot instead ^ * Think 





That a p p a r e n t l y i s ' "onius iog ' - ... — - j wore c l ac ; . and / r h i t e , 
18 | they were on ly from the chest , up. 
THE WITNESS: The l e n g t h , y e s . 
20 I MS, NESSET-SALE: T h i s i s r e a l ] I f e . Ar:< 3 ti: 1:1 1 ik 
a b c M t t h a t nigh t: : ' 1 1 d i t f s o k a y e i 11 1 e 1: w a y ' o k a \ • 
22 j identify somebody and it's okay not to, whatever. 
23 j THE WITFESS: Let's see, I saw him from, here up, 
2 4 I wasn't lookinq down,- I was 1 ooking at the face, II1 ,. 1 ess h 1 s 
hair has changed, which here you go back to that mugshot, I 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
26 
spy thai- coat was only about that wide. He wasn't husky, if 
you knew what J mean. j 
MR. WALSH: Yes, I see. I 
MS. NESSET-SALE: The only question, though, Mrs. ! 
Pippy, do you recognize the face of one of these eight men as 
being the face of the man who said those things to you and who 
hit vou with the club? If you don't see the face up here, | 
leave this blank. If you see the face, put the number down. 
THE WITNESS: T r.-n't ^ay thrlt T ? a" ¥h*<- f * ^ i n 
! 
that line up. * 
MR. WALSH: All right. j 
MS, "ESSET-SALE: That's fine. ; 
MP. WALSH: So you could just leave it blank. Okay. 
Cc you want to step outside into the corridor, Mrs. Pippy? 
Thank you. s 
! 
1HE WITNESS: I don't want to send the wrong mar. up. j 
MS. NESSET-SALE: No, we'd like to send the right I 
man UP, net the wrong man. 
THE WITNESS: 3y colly, I want to make sure I name j 
hjjn, because I know one thing, someone will be killed by him. j 
MS, NESSET-SALE: Well, I'm sure that that's a real j 
j 
possibility. Thank you for coming down, Mrs. Pippy. ' 
THE WITNESS: I'm only too happy to. | 





THE WITNESS: You bet. Arvwov vo>, w.-=nt. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: 7 : h i 
you, ma'am, 
THE WITNESS: \'cu LL ... That's all right. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: Evo P-w , M • n . P i ppv I hope you 
are feeling a little stronger. 
THE WITNESS: It ta __.7.e. 
(Or! ' • " record.) 
MR. WALSH: • entlerr.er., ycu rid ve~- •:^. " 
appreciate your help. Than,-; y c . 
(At this tin> ' :: 'er 
12 J Rick Somers is now taking two photographs under the direction 
13 ! of Sergeant Mai las.) 






















C E R T I F I C A T E 
S1ATL OF UT/»H 
;s. 
CCUN1Y OF SALT LAKE) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the line-up, at the Salt 
Lake Jeilf in the line-up named, was taken before me, Diane 
!!. Winter, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in 
and for the State of Utah, residing at Salt Lake City, Utah. 
T!i3t the said witnesses, were by me, before 
exairi nation, *nly sworn "to testify the truth, the whole truth, 
and nochirg but the truth in said cause. 
That the testimony of said witnesses were reported 
by we in Stenotvpe, and thereafter caused by me to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that a full, true and 
'-nrr°ct transcription of 'sard testimony so taken and 
tranccribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered from 
^ to ?7f inclusive, and said witness deposed and said as in 
the t"regoing annexed deposition. 
I fJither rertify that I am not of kin or otherwise 
arso' ^"j|*ec! *'*th any cf the parties to said cause of action, 
and th-»t T an not interested in the event thereof. 
wrirESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this l^th day of October, 1935. 
' ** 
V\> Jc-vt nii «3jf xppu „EKP i r e s : 
DIANH I«I. WINTEK, 
Utah License No. 
LINE-UP INSTRUCTIONS 
DATE: ^ c- s 
SIGNATURE: ^ c U k t ^ ^ 9 ^ 
CASE K-'vi:•<' 
this line-up a: the individual v^olveu . 
crime, please mark • *;n^ tc JZC* below t i e ;iu... 
the per 
I f you *iv .IOL recognize anyone parti c i -
,1-u" i"u in this line-up, please leave the space 
1 " i lH, 
ADDENDUM ", 
OF UTAH 
December !.'• », 1935 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Third District Court Judge 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE? Juan Cantu 
CR 85-10&7 
Pursuant to cout'* n^l«r imder UOA 71-I5«!> I evaluated Juan Cantu, recently 
convictsd of aggravated burglary, robbery and assault, in the Salt Lake 
County Jail on December 6, 1985 for one and a quarter hours. In addition I 
reviewed fhe criminal information of the Salt Lake City Police DepartE<;nt 
investigation report of the crimes on December 22, 1984. Also, I spoke with 
M s «jiflt?r Coring Mantis and another sister's cother-in-law (al io an 
acquaintance) Qclidaa Chicon. 
ISSUES: 
1) Whether the defendant 1 s presently mentally il 1. 
2) Whether the defendant is presently competent to procede to sentencing, 
i.e. whet-her he, by reason of mental disease or deficit, is unable to 
comprehend the punishment specified for the offense charged, or unable," to 
assist hts counsel at the sentencing hearing, 
.?"> Wieth?r the defendant was co-
dating his District Court trial. 
OPINIONS: 
1) The defendant presently appears to be* suffering from a psychotic mental 
illness of undetermined type* probably acnizophrenia. 
2) Even though mentally ill, he is nevertheless competent to procede " o 
sentencing, as be has ft full appreciation of the nature and consequencas of 
tho sentencing procesn, and the punishment specified for the offense of 




SCKXX OP MFC'C N8 
50 N O ^ H MED-CAL D&'vE 
SALT ^A*f CiTY U 'AM 84132 
801 5fit 7Q51 
Jyjn Cantu 
D^cc^bsr 10, 1905 
P??:« ? 
J) Likewipe, it appears that even though mentally ill during his trial, he 
wasi nevertheless able to comprehend uhe nature of the procedings against 
him, and was able to assist his counsel in his defense in rational ways, not 
withstanding ^om^ irrational behavior during trial such as providing Bible 
verses to his attorney. 
DATA AND REASONING: 
Juan Cantu is a 35 year old man convicted of aggravated burglary, robbery, 
and assault, in a trial during which evidence clearly placed him at the 
sc*ne of the crime* He presently denies any guilt; although this denial is 
common in many if not most convicted felons, I believe it to be a symptom of 
his psychotic process as well. 
Because the focus of my evaluation is his present mental state, I explored 
this to a greater extent than past history. However, contributing to this 
present understanding is the fact that he was hospitalized in a psychiatric 
hospital in San Antonio when he was a young teenager for approximately six, 
months. I pither he nor his sister can give me a diagnosis nor kind of 
treatment offered at that time. 
He states that he was educated through the sixth or seventh grade, but later 
received hl3 GED while in prison. Past crimes have included drunk driving, 
the rape of a child (for which he served seven years), and attempted bur-
glary. 
\IH admits to an alcohol and drug history, consuming up to a "lid" of mari-
juana a day at times in the past. 
During imprisonment in Texas for the sexual assault of the child, he stated 
th« »ie hallucinated the voice of God and the voices of others, and became 
severely depressed to the extent he attempted to hang himself. He describes 
an extensive retreat Into hyperreligiostty during that imprisonment, for 
which he was treated with the anti-psychotic medication Thorazine. 
His present conversation is full of references to religious experience, such 
as hearing the voice of Jesus, seeing him in visions, and a over concern 
with religious work which he feels called to do. Specifically, he believes 
that he has been called to minister to criminal men from broken families, 
and he plans to do this on the street if granted probation. 
Present Competency: 
I ec>pha8J?e the contingency, because, although his verbal productions are 
full of references to the Hallucinated (I believe) voice of Jesus, he is 
able to maintain the perspective that he has been convicted of a serious 
crime, is required to appear in court before an earthly Judge for sentencing 
for that crin*; appreciates the purposes of sentencing, and the potential 
choices the judge night have (imprisonment, probation, 90 day evaluation, 
etc.); understands the possible length of time he could be Imprisoned, and 
finally the f-?ct that he would be imprisoned as a punishment for a crime of 
which he w?« convicted, rather than sent to the prison on a special reli-
gious mission* 
j u in rar*ru 
Pecctatei 10, 198S 
Page 3 
The latter is important., because although he states that he will speak to 
others in prison about his religious beliefs, he would obviously prefer to 
carry on his life on the streets, ;nd does not specifically carry the 
psychotic delusion that he is being imprisoned either for his religious 
beliefs, or for the purpose of carrying out his ministry. 
Mental status examination during interview showed him to be alert oriented 
snd cooperative. He answered my questions appropriately, psychotic behavior 
did not intrude upon the purpose of our evaluation (although it was obvious 
he much preferred to discuss his religious beliefs than to discuss the 
sentencing and possible imprisonment); and from his ability to cooperate 
with the intent of my interview, I must infer that he is able to do likewise 
with his attorney at sentencing. 
Past Competency Inferred: 
Although his psychotic religious beliefs intruded on his discourse with his 
attorney, they apparently did not substantially interfere with the process 
of defense, and were not disruptive at trial. 
The possibility regains that his presence at his trial was purely physical, 
in that he wag mentally preoccupied with his religious beliefs or even that 
be believed on the ba«is of a delusional system that he must remain unin-
votved or even conceal exculpatory information. If information is available 
which ir? contradictory to my inferred opinion, such information must be 
given greater weight and credibility. Of particular importance is his 
actual behavior at trial, in the experience of both counsel and the court. 
Prognosis ond Treatment: 
Delu?ior.nl pnychones occurring during incarceration are not uncommon, are 
more frequent in these genetically and biochemically predisposed to thu 
illness schizophrenia, and psychodynamically may be thought of as occurring 
in order to ^ard off overwhelming feelings of guilt, remorse and self-
loathing, the severity of which may culminate in suicide*attempts as they 
have in the past with this defendant. 
Treatment of the illness consists of anti-psychotic medication, which may be 
made available in prison, or as an outpatient as a condition of probation. 
Prognosis is poor. His self described religiosity in the past has not lead 
to significant decrease in criminal behavior, and is unlikely to do so in 
the future* 
Further, because the experience is so intensely rewarding - few can claim 
the privilege of hearing Jesus* voice actually spoken aloud - he is unlikely 
to recognize his psychotic illness for what it is. Unfortunally the illness 
is likely to progress tc severe depression and potential self destruction as 
it h«m in the past, so close observation and treatment are in my opinion 
mandatory. 
Juan f^ntu 
December ! C 1985 
Page 4 
Thank >ou for ths opportunity to examine this defendant. If you have any 
Questions please call me* 
Sincerely, 
/>^C'/f -J.c it*U<* { 
flrsck Lebegue, M.D" 
Assistant Clinical Professor 
Director Forensic Psychiatry Service 
Diplomat*, American Board of Psychiatry 
and Neurology 
Diplomats, American Board of Forensic 
Psychiatry 






POPULATION BY RACE (INCLUDING SPANISH ORIGIN) AND COUNTY 
























NUMBER OF PERSONS AMD RACE1 
AM. INDIAN ASIAN AND 
ESKIMO AND PACIFIC 
BLACK ALEUT ISLANDER OTHER 
SPANISH 
ORIGIN 
1,382,550 9,225 19,256 15,076 34,930 60,302 
Er,>VER 


















































































































































































































































































a. Juror is disqualified from serving in any case: 
i Felony conviction 
ii, Want of any legal qualification rendering a person 
a competent juror. 
iii. Unsoundness of mind or body rendering him incapable 
of performing juror duties (17-30-17, Utah Code 
Annotated) 
2. Particular 
a. Juror is disqualified from serving in action on trial 
i Implied bias 
(a) Existence of facts ascertained renderning 
juror's mind contra to impartiality. 
(b) Existence of stare of juror's mind contra to 
Impartiality (77-30-18, Utah Code Annotated) 
III 
JURY SELECTION -- MECHANICS 
After each side has exercised both preemptory challenges and 
challenge? for cause, if any, the panel will be selected. In 
misdemeanor matters, the jury panel may consist of four jurors 
and in felony matters of eight jurors. 
In making challenges, the baliff will hand the attorney for the 
defendant first a card bearing the names of all of the jury 
panel; at which time counsel for the defense will strike his 
fir.?r preemptory challenge indicating that it is defendant's 
number one challenge and placing his initials after the challenge. 
Th° card v? 11 then be passed to the State who will exercise his 
first pre'n.pfcory challenge in the same fashion and this will 
occ^ until the specified number of preemptory challenges have 
bee: exercised. The panel will then be selected and sworn. 
Jur^ ; Qualifications 
1. While there is no specific rule as to which individuals make 
good jurors favorable to the prosecution, as a general rule, 
the following classifications can be asserted generally: 
a. Technical professionals Good jurors 


















The very young 




Artists and Musicians 
Bartenders 
Insurance men 
People wearing sunglasses 
Some law training 
social workers 
Poor for blue collar crimes 








Poor jurors except on robbery 




WOMEN' S AS A <JLNE?AL RULF ALWAYS GET RID OF THE ODD JUROR, I.E. 
.IBBER, HUPY TYPES, THE REVOLUTIONARY, ETC, 
AS A RULE OF THUMB, WHEN IN DOUBT -- STRIKE 
C. The Voire Dire 
1. Voire Pire examination in Utah courts is generally done by 
the trial judge. Many prosecutors tend to let the judge do 
all of fhe work, but there may be certain questions thau 
the judge will not ask or not ask properly that the prose-
cutor will want to ascertain. The prosecutor may ask the 
qMestion? himself, but more properly he should request of 
the Court that a specific question be asked the individual 
juror or the panel in general. A prosecutor should be par-
ticularly mindful of the following kinds of cases and proceed 
with a more detailed and complex voire dire if you feel 
that the judge has not properly examined the panel. The 
following kinds of issues should be dealt with some care on 
voire dire: 
a. Qualification in capital cases. 
b. Circumstantial evidence, i.e., not second class evidence 
(16) 
ADDENDUM E 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2^6 
You are instructed that not only every person who 
directly connits the criminal act, but also any person, acting 
with the rrental state required for ther commission of the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in the conduct 
which constitutes an offense, shall be criminally liable as 
a party fcr such conduct. 
ADDENDUM F 
Photo of Juan Cantu 
W- S A L , " -MCECO'-'NTY 
M< SHLRII-i J DLPT. 
SLC UI 
*P&ii2lb 
Photo Mrs. Pipr-y identified ns her assailant (T.300) 
